Internet-based social media sites have been increasingly used to organize political activism across the globe. Given recent events in Egypt where Wael Ghonim"s role as social networker, Google executive, and activist coalesced at the center of an information-based revolution, or the much publicized use of BlackBerry Messenger to organize protests, riots, and looting in England, it is difficult to ignore the effect social networks have had on major political events. Beginning with a review of some of the key historical and conceptual accounts of the political implications of the Internet and social media over the last ten years, this article provides an analysis of how the political use of social media in recent events in Egypt and England has been represented by the mainstream western media.
INTRODUCTION
The first time Internet-based social media sites like Twitter or Facebook were linked to a political movement was in the spring of 2009 when activists in Moldova used Twitter to organize large protests against the governing Communist party.
Later that year officials in the U.S. State Department asked Twitter to put off scheduled maintenance because they feared that a break in service would disrupt the activity of anti-government activists in Iran. 1 Since then it has become clear that social media can be a powerful tool for both political struggle and geopolitical strategy. Given recent events in Egypt where Wael Ghonim"s role as social networker, Google executive, and activist coalesced at the center of an informationbased revolution, or the much publicized use of BlackBerry Messenger to organize protests, riots, and looting in England, it is increasingly difficult to ignore the effect social networks have had on major political events. While the goals of recent mass mobilizations in Tehran, Tel Aviv, London, and San Francisco are radically different, each has been reported as both a political event and a media event, and each, incidentally, has been triggered by (some combination of) three points of conflict:
the perception of political corruption, police violence, and the broadening inequality in the distribution of wealth. . 2 The four locations listed here represent a small sampling of recent political actions which have deployed social media to organize or publicize events. I refer to recent protests in Tel Aviv and San Francisco in particular to briefly highlight the global spread of social media as a political tool. In Tel Aviv protesters occupied public areas in October 2011 in order to bring attention to homelessness and income inequality, while in San Francisco transit officials cut off internet service in order to disrupt protests after a fatal shooting by a police officer working for the Bay Area Rapit Transit System (BART). We could add to this list many of the protests linked to the Occupy Wall Street movement beginning in the fall of 2011. I will discuss the events of Tehran and London below.
history of social media, the particular qualities of its evolving forms, and access to the technology all play a role in how social media has been used in political struggles and in how it has been represented in the mainstream media. Rather 
POLITICS, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND THE MARKET
Political claims about the democratizing potential of the Internet emerged in the 1990s with the popularization of the technology. In an early essay on the topic, Tiziana Terranova adeptly analyzed the political potential of the Internet with its relationship to contemporary capitalism, the emergent "knowledge class," and the open up new and demographically specific markets that could be targeted for political contributions. These contributions operated in the form of a commodity purchase within the framework of Internet marketing and advertising. In this case the "purchase" takes the form of a political donation, but the exchange more closely follows the traditional form of commodity consumption whereby the consumer"s actions are linked to the construction of an identity, i.e., the experience or belief that the types of commodities we purchase reflect our identity. The ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 2 2011
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identification with the commodity in this case seems to be prior to the act of buying/supporting the political campaign, but, as with commodity consumption more generally, the identification actually emerges as a result of the purchase rather than as something which exists prior to the purchase. Put differently, the act of "buying in" to a political position as the result of an on-line marketing campaign serves primarily to produce identification with the politician/product and secondarily to bring in money to the campaign. This is why Terranova connects the construction of "consensus" to the expansion of markets and commodity consumption as one of the primary functions of the Internet. In this example, rather than a political intervention, the Internet simply streamlined and extended an ongoing process in which political affiliation is formally connected to commodity consumption and brand loyalty.
In the case of Obama"s fundraising strategy, the Internet fulfilled its function as a tool for expanding a market for a certain political identity into diverse 
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL MEDIA
In October 2010 Malcolm Gladwell wrote a polarizing analysis of the relation between social media and politics. A best-selling author known for popularizing academic sociology, Gladwell took a strong stand against the role of social media in recent political events. Not only had Twitter not had an actual effect on events inside Iran, he argues, but "social media can"t provide what social change has always required." 7 What social change requires, according to Gladwell, is a "strongtie" between participants engaged in high-risk activism which cannot be replicated in the cyber-world. Put simply, his claim is that close, personal ties between participants are essential for "real" political activism and that social media cannot Gladwell goes on to claim that high-risk activism is a "strong-tie" phenomenon by referring to several other revolutionary events, such as the demonstrations in East
Germany prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. While these events looked spontaneous from the outside, according to Gladwell they were each the result of well-planned, hierarchical organizations which were made up of small groups with a significant, if decentered system of communication. For Gladwell, "real" political actions occur as the result of direct, face-to-face interactions that are combined with emotional, interpersonal investment. In order to stand up and put oneself at risk, this argument goes, one needs to be in a system of reciprocal responsibility.
Thus, it is not surprising that Gladwell argues that the formal quality of social media itself necessarily limits its potential for "real" or "high-risk" activism. insists that the direct material connections we have with actual friends and family will determine our level of political engagements with "real" events. 8 While coming from different perspectives, both Gladwell and Terranova are suspicious of the potential for social media to have a significant impact on political 8 Gladwell"s argument is referring to a classic sociology essay from the 1970s by Mark Granovetter which analyzed social and political movements using the theory of networks. It is significant that Granovetter"s theory is not a critique of "weak-ties" in political movements as Gladwell"s argument implies. Instead, Granovetter argues that there is "strength in weak ties" for grass roots political activism. they are chronically prone to conflict and error." 9 They are, in short, good for markets but not good for humans.
Gladwell goes on to define two distinct types of political action, the first is modeled on real relationships and is capable of systemic change; as he says, "[I]f you"re taking on a powerful and organized establishment you have to be a hierarchy." While network-based political organizations are limited to actions which can only "frighten or humiliate or make a splash." 10 The implications of this argument are clear from the examples he goes on to use, while the Montgomery bus boycott succeeded because of the "military precision" of its organizational structure, the Palestine Liberation Organization"s network structure has made it ineffective because it is "vulnerable to outside manipulation and internal strife." 11 In the end, Gladwell holds to a traditional definition of politics.
Terranova, in contrast, embraces the structural contradictions embodied in the development of the Internet and contemporary, information-based capitalismand, specifically, the forms of labor it requires-in order to challenge the definition of political action in a world where the personal, political, and economicnot only overlap, but are in many instances indistinct from one another. The question she asks is not whether the Internet can affect political events but "whether the Internet embodies a continuation of capital or a break with it." 12 At the very least, the activities that make up social media mimic the activities and skills required by emergent forms of contemporary labor, and for Terranova the result of this is an
Internet which serves to expand the capitalist market extensively (by 9 Malcolm Gladwell, supra note 7. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Tiziana Terranova, supra note 5: 38.
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 2 2011 111 geographically connecting new markets to the Internet) and intensively (by accessing more and more time from those who are already connected). At the same time she argues that if it is the case that capitalism is operating today in a way that is closer to a network than a hierarchy, then the form of political resistance will necessarily have to meet capital/politics on this emergent organizational terrain.
Terranova is suspicious of the idea that the Internet could facilitate a political movement which threatened the market from which it emerged, but she is simultaneously capable of seeing how that fact could also inform emergent political theory. thirty years-old or younger, and that these "educated but unemployed" youth were frustrated and ready to act. Armed with "Twitter and satellite television broadcasts"
rather than "terrorism and tanks," these "kids with keyboards" brought down an "aging autocratic Pharaoh" with the "weapons of the young." 16 Newsweek"s depiction of the events was more of a cloak and dagger story. Opening with a description of the final contact between Ghonim and his associate in Washington D.C. minutes before he was picked up by police, the story unfolds, as they say, "like a shadowy cyber thriller." 17 In both versions, social media emerged as the medium through which a savvy public relations and marketing campaign was deployed against an ancient, uninformed, and unconnected, regime. In the final analysis the power and potential inherent in anonymously organized, networkbased mass political action was adeptly managed by those who, like Wael Ghonim, were mediating the protests through the tools of social media.
As the subtitle of the Newsweek article puts it, "Wael Ghonim"s day job was at
Google. But at night he was organizing a revolution." At the time of the events in Egypt, Ghonim was Google"s Regional Marketing Manager for the Middle East and he lived with his wife and two kids in an affluent suburb of Dubai. He started working with politics and social media when, a year before, he took over managing 15 The weekly print magazine Newsweek and the televised "news magazine" 60 Minutes (CBS) are two of the most recognizable and respected mainstream news publications in the United States. 16 22 Ghonim explains that police violence was a symptom of the lack of rights in Egypt and it was this realization that inspired him to create the Facebook page that was later credited with starting the revolution.
That a half-million people were in some way politicized by the death of Khalid Sayid is a meaningful and powerful part of this narrative. 18 Ibid. 19 or politically significant, it would have had to have come from an officer, or someone else who was capable of a self-reflexive political position. Ghonim explains that he forgives the soldiers who beat him because "they were convinced that I was harming the country … so when he hits me, he doesn"t hit me because, you know, It is clear that Ghonim"s account is only one part of a complicated story, but the question we are left with is not whether his story is the story that makes sense of these events; rather, it is why his story is the only story told in the West.
Ghonim is intensely invested in not only telling his story, as the story of the middle class, but in suppressing the idea that the revolution was about food prices or income inequality or, further, that the uneducated poor were a factor in its success.
For example, in a break from the formal 60 Minutes interview Ghonim introduces the correspondent Harry Smith to his family and at one point excitedly shows Smith a YouTube video of a protest song. He sings along with the song, repeating the lyrics in English: "We went down to the streets, We held our heads up to the sky," the song begins, but after the third line, "hunger does not matter to us anymore," The most important thing is our rights." He says this to Smith and to the camera in a clear reference to a prior conversation. But there is no mention of food prices in the interview, or of the idea that there might have been a moment when the protest changed from being about food to being about rights, if in fact it ever did.
My point here is not to critique Ghonim, or to reveal a "truth" behind the employing "our" tools "they" aspire to become "us".
25
The insistence that these events be read through a narrative that justifies the form of western liberal political subjectivity by pointing to its emergence in "other" 
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Egypt seem to support both Terranova and Gladwell"s critiques of the potential of social media to effect real political change. The event was determined by "strongties" and where social media did have an effect it primarily served to enforce a preexisting western model of economic and political subjectivity. But something else also emerged from these events. The use of social media by a small minority to transform the events from a populist revolt to a democratic revolution revealed structural tensions about class, identity, and access to technology. In this case, social media is still only being used as a tool to amplify dominant political and economic positions, while the more radical potential of this technology would imply the creation of new forms of political association, community, and subjectivity.
There is a long history of celebrating the utopian potential of the Internet, but the reality would require us to think of social media as an unstable political force that has the power to affect the form of collective subject positions which may not follow comfortable political narratives. Simply put, there is no guarantee that the use of social media will continue to produce or facilitate a form of political subjectivity which is palatable to dominant political standpoints.
READING THE RIOTS
In addition to his work on Egypt, Ramesh Srinivasan recently published a defense of the political use of social media in response to the riots which broke out across England in the summer of 2011. Srinivasan points out that the rioters used BlackBerry Messenger (BBM) rather than Twitter or Facebook to, as he puts it, "incite large groups to act on behalf of a cause." Srinivasan argues that the form of the technology used in a political event "could impact the shape of a protest or riot." 26 The fact that you need someone to accept your "friendship" to view their Facebook page, or that, inversely, every Twitter feed is accessible to anyone on the Internet, will influence the form of association that results from their use.
BlackBerry Messenger is a private social network which sends out encrypted messages that are difficult or impossible to trace, while its "broadcast" function allows users to send a single message to multiple contacts in a way that can be replicated and thus one person can communicate with thousands of users very quickly. While posting on Facebook and Twitter leaves a digital trace, BBM works more like a text message which uses the mobile network to transmit its data. In the riots, messages were sent out on BBM and then "amplified" across other social networks in a way that proved too sophisticated for local police to follow in real Even though the riots first started after protests erupted over the police shooting of a black man in Tottenham, the race of the rioters has been determined to be unimportant and the government has continually rejected arguments that race or any form of political protest was a cause in these events. 32 The branded hoodie, the bandana, and the bag all support the idea that the rioters had thought ahead, organized their actions, and were acting principally out of a desire to steal consumer commodities. The Adidas brand emphasizes the idea that the rioter is materialistic, and further that he either has enough money to buy expensive clothes and thus is rioting for fun or he is already a criminal having accessed his expensive Following the media"s tendency to de-politicize these events, Justice Secretary
Kenneth Clarke has publically blamed the riots on the "criminal classes." He claims that those involved in the rioting were "individuals and families familiar with the justice system" who make up "a feral underclass, cut off from the mainstream in everything but its materialism." 33 David Cameron has presented a similar, if more polite, story in which the riots were the result of a "slow motion moral collapse" that is in no way linked to economic or political conditions. 34 Cameron has repeated the claim that "these riots were not about poverty" on many occasions even after analysis of those arrested clearly shows that the vast majority were from very poor neighborhoods and that 66% also lived in areas that have seen a major decline in income and employment in the last ten years. The information emerging from the BBC"s study clearly shows that a relationship between economic conditions, the lack of employment, and the continuation of policies in England that have steadily cut or eliminated social programs for the poor is the stark reality behind these events.
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As in the media accounts of the Egyptian revolution, the idea that economic inequality could lead to political action has been ignored or downplayed in the 32 A recent poll showed that the majority of English people blamed the riots on minorities (Matthew Taylor, "British Public "are more prejudiced against minorities after the riots"," Guardian. The images which dominated the reporting of the riots depicted youths breaking into stores, beating people, stealing from injured bystanders, and defiantly walking the streets with the merchandise they had stolen from local stores. These actions are obviously criminal and not political; they are selfmotivated and they shock us primarily because they fly in the face of what can loosely be called the social contract. But for all the handwringing, blaming, and prosecution, there has been very little discussion of why generally law abiding young people would blatantly riot and destroy their own neighborhoods.
One of the most shocking bits of media that emerged from the riots was neither an image of a rioter in a hoodie nor evidence of violence or rage. It was a brief interview of two young women on the morning after a night of rioting in which they, excitedly and drunkenly, describe the events of the previous night and give an explanation as to why the riots were happening:
--Everyone was just going to riot, just going mad. Like chucking things, chucking bottles. Breaking stuff.
--It was good, though. It was madness. Good fun.
--Yea, good fun.
[Interviewer]: So you"re drinking a bottle of rose wine at half-nine in the morning?
--Yea, free alcohol
[Interviewer]: Have you been drinking all night?
--Yea, yea. It was the government"s fault. Conservatives.
--It"s not even a riot, we"re just showing the police we do what we want.
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--Yea, and now we have.
[Interviewer]: Do you think it will go on tonight?
--Hopefully!
[Interviewer]: But these are local people, why is it targeting local people?
--It"s the rich people, the people that got businesses, and that"s why all of this happened. Because of the rich people.
--So we"re just showing the rich people we do what we want.
36
What was scandalous about this short interview is not that they were young women, or that they had been stealing stuff and "drinking all night," or even how they justified their actions ("just showing the police/rich we do what we want"), but that the rioting was a source of pleasure. These girls were not angry, inhuman, or violent-they were having the time of their lives. This response raises several questions as to the potential political stakes of their actions. The emotions they express could be an effect of the pleasure of transgression and the thrill of being swept up in a mass of people, but two things stand out that point to a more complex cause. First, their pleasure is expressed both as excitement and as something commonplace. They both agree that rioting is "good fun," as if it were a regular activity or generally accepted behavior. Second, they quickly attempt to both downplay the events ("it"s not even a riot") and to ascribe a political cause by blaming the conservatives, the police, or the rich. While it would be easy to dismiss these comments as meaningless, the logic which the girls use to express their actions makes a strong claim for an underlying political cause for these events.
They say it is not a riot. Instead, they describe it as a collective expression of agency on the part ("we") of the young and dispossessed against those with property. First one blames the conservatives (those behind the cuts in social programs), then the other blames the police (the face of political repression), but when pushed by the interviewer to comment on how they could be destroying their own neighborhood the girls come to agreement that their goal is to stand up to the 
